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ARTICLES
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:
GUILTY, BUT NOT AS CHARGED
RAYMOND H. BRESCIAt
INTRODUCTION
Since its passage in 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act
("CRA")1  has charged federal bank regulators with
"encourag[ing]" certain financial institutions "to help meet the
credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered
consistent with.., safe and sound" banking practices.2 Even
before the CRA became law-and ever since-it has become a
flashpoint. Depending on one's perspective, this simple and
somewhat soft directive has led some to charge that it imposes
unfair burdens on financial institutions and helped to fuel the
subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 and the financial crisis that
followed.' According to this argument, the CRA forced banks to
t Associate Professor of Law, and Director, Government Law Center, Albany
Law School; J.D., Yale Law School (1992); B.A., Fordham University (1989);
formerly the Associate Director of the Urban Justice Center in New York City, a
Skadden Fellow at The Legal Aid Society of New York, law clerk to the Honorable
Constance Baker Motley, and staff attorney at New Haven Legal Assistance
Association. Special thanks to those who gave thoughtful feedback on previous
versions of this work, including Christine Sgarlata Chung, Kathleen C. Engel,
Richard D. Marsico, and Elizabeth Renuart. The author would also like to thank his
research assistants on this project, Sherri Eckles, and his legal assistant, Theresa
Colbert.
1 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (2012).
2 Id. § 2901(b).
3 See, e.g., Howard Husock, Op-Ed., Housing Goals We Can't Afford, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2008, at A49 (asserting that regulatory changes to the CRA helped fuel the
subprime mortgage crisis); Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed., Catharsis, Then
Common Sense, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2008, at A23 (blaming the CRA for
encouraging risky lending that led to the financial crisis); Russell Roberts, Op-Ed.,
How Government Stoked the Mania; Housing Prices Would Never Have Risen So
High Without Multiple Washington Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008, at A21
(blaming the CRA for pressuring banks to make risky loans).
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make risky loans to less-than creditworthy borrowers. Others
defend the CRA, arguing that it had little to do with the risky
subprime lending at the heart of the crisis.4
Early research into the relationship between the mortgage
crisis and the CRA generally vindicated those in the camp that
believed the CRA had little to do with the risky lending that
fueled these crises. Because of the CRA's limitations, this
research found that much of this lending was beyond the CRA's
scope. For one, the CRA mostly applies to depository
institutions. Given that much of the subprime lending
undertaken during the mortgage frenzy of the last decade was
carried out by stand-alone mortgage lenders who were non-
depository institutions, roughly half of this type of risky lending
was carried out by institutions that operated beyond the law's
reach. But there are other reasons that ultimately placed the
overwhelming majority of all subprime lending during the height
of the frenzy outside the CRA's protections. In addition to the
exclusion of non-depository institutions from the CRA, two other
limitations on the CRA mostly placed subprime lending outside
of its purview. First, the CRA generally only applies to lending
to low- and moderate-income borrowers who reside within a
covered institution's CRA "assessment area"-that is, locations
where banks have their branches or engage in a substantial
amount of lending.5 Second, it only covers the activities of
covered banks' non-depository subsidiaries, in their assessment
areas, when the parent bank chooses to have the subsidiary's
activities reviewed under the CRA. Because of these
exemptions-that the CRA covers only depository institutions,
that regulators enforcing the Act look at covered banks' activities
within their respective CRA assessment areas, and that the law
covers the activities of subsidiaries only at a given parent bank's
' See, e.g., Aaron Pressman, Community Reinvestment Act Had Nothing To Do
with Subprime Crisis, BUS. WK. (Sept. 29, 2008), httpJ/www.businessweek.com/
investing/insights/blog/archives/2008/09/community-reinvestment act had nothing
todo with subprime_crisis.html.
5 12 C.F.R. § 25.41 (2014); see also Memorandum from Glenn Canner & Neil
Bhutta, Div. of Research & Statistics, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., to
Sandra Braunstein, Dir., Consumer & Cmty. Affairs Div., Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. 1-2 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at httpJ/www.federalreserve.gov/
newseventsspeechI20081203_analysis.pdf.
6 Canner & Bhutta, supra note 5, at 2.
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option-at least ninety-four percent of all subprime lending
during the height of the subprime mortgage market was beyond
the scope of the CRA.v
Despite these facts, researchers affiliated with the National
Bureau of Economic Research ("NBER")8 conducted a recent
study and reviewed bank lending patterns from 1999-2009 to
conclude that the CRA did cause banks to make riskier loans
during this time frame, especially the years 2004-2006.' As part
of the CRA enforcement scheme, federal regulators conduct
regular CRA examinations of banks covered by the law and
assess whether those institutions are meeting their CRA
obligations.1 ° This study analyzed the activities of banks both
before and after their CRA examinations during this ten-year
time period to determine whether the periodic CRA examinations
of particular banks-when regulators review those banks'
practices to assess whether the goals of the CRA are being met-
tended to lead to increased incidents of riskier lending.
The theory behind the research was that if banks engaged in
riskier lending before and after their respective CRA
examinations, it would suggest that the CRA examination
process-and, hence, the CRA-led to this type of lending.
Taking the research to its logical conclusion-which, admittedly,
the NBER researchers do not do explicitly-if riskier lending is
I Id. at 3. Another relevant point about the CRA is that covered financial
institutions can obtain CRA "credit" for a wide range of activities having little to do
with home mortgage lending. Thus, while home mortgage lending to certain
communities is relevant to the CRA, much bank activity having nothing to do with
such lending is also relevant to a given bank's CRA record. See Community
Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community
Reinvestment; Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,642, 11,643 (Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter
Interagency Questions and Answers].
1 Despite the word "national" in its name, the NBER is not a governmental
entity. It describes itself on its website as follows: "Founded in 1920, the National
Bureau of Economic Research is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan research
organization dedicated to promoting a greater understanding of how the economy
works. The NBER is committed to undertaking and disseminating unbiased
economic research ... among public policymakers, business professionals, and the
academic community." About the NBER, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES.,
http://www.nber.org/info.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2014).
1 Sumit Agarwal et al., Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to
Riskier Lending? 4, 21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18609,
2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18609.
10 For a description of the elements of a CRA exam, see infra Part I.
2014]
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what led to the present financial crisis, then one could argue that
the CRA would have played some role in helping to cause the
crisis.
Because the NBER study appeared to find a connection
between banks' CRA examinations and some forms of risky
lending, particularly during the period between 2004 and 2006
when subprime lending was at its height, these findings have
indeed led some to conclude that the CRA had a role in the crisis
that followed. 1 As more fully described below, this study has its
flaws, however, which include that the study failed to assess only
bank lending actually covered by the CRA.
This Article reviews the existing research on the subject of
the impact of the CRA on subprime lending to assess the role the
CRA played in the mortgage crisis of 2007 and the financial crisis
that followed. This Article also takes the analysis a step further,
and asks what role the CRA played in failing to prevent these
crises, particularly its impact on low- and moderate-income
communities-that is, the very communities the law was
designed to protect. Based on a review of the best existing
evidence, the initial verdict of not guilty-that the CRA did not
cause the financial crisis, as some argue-still holds up on
appeal. At the same time, as more fully described in this piece,
an appreciation for the weaknesses inherent in the law's
structure, when combined with an understanding of the manner
in which it was enforced by regulators, leads one to a different
conclusion; although the CRA did not cause the crisis, it failed to
prevent the very harms it was designed to prevent from befalling
the very communities it was-and still is- supposed to protect.
The defects in the CRA that emerge from this review, in
total, suggest not that the CRA was too strong, but rather, too
weak. They also point to important reforms that should be put in
place to strengthen and fine-tune the CRA to ensure that it can
meet its important goal: ensuring that financial institutions meet
the needs of low- and moderate-income communities,
communities for which access to capital and banking services on
fair terms is a necessary condition for economic development, let
alone economic survival.
11 J.D. Tuccille, Study Says Community Reinvestment Act Induced Banks To




With the goals of assessing the state of the research on the
CRA and drawing some insights into what reforms this research
suggests, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an
overview of the CRA's structure and reach. Part II provides an
overview of the impact of the financial crisis on low- and
moderate-income communities, particularly communities of color.
Part III assesses the current state of the research, with
particular emphasis on the NBER report described above. Part
IV identifies the disconnect between the CRA's reach and its
goals given the current state of banking and makes suggestions
for reforms to make the CRA more responsive to banking in the
twenty-first century.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CRA
The CRA was passed by Congress to improve financial
institution responsiveness to the needs of low- and moderate-
income communities. 2 In the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement,
informed by evidence of widespread discrimination in the
housing and lending contexts, helped to usher in a wave of
statutes designed to combat discriminatory practices with respect
to renting and selling real estate, including discrimination in
mortgage lending.'3  These statutes make it illegal to reject
prospective renters, buyers, and borrowers on account of such
grounds as race and ethnicity, among others. In the 1970s, after
the exposure of the practice of "redlining"-the decision by
banking institutions to exclude certain communities from the
12 Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act
and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 516-17 (2005) (explaining that the CRA was
"[plassed in response to concerns about redlining of minority and low-income areas,
and market failures in low-income communities ... [and it] encourages federally
insured banks and thrifts to meet the credit needs of the entire communities that
they serve, including low- and moderate-income areas, consistent with safe and
sound banking practices").
1" See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521
(1974) (barring discrimination in the extension of credit) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)-(e) (2012)); Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81
(1968) (barring discrimination in real estate transactions, including, among other
things, rental, sale, and mortgage transactions) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3533, 3535, 3601-3619 (2012)).
20141
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provision of bank services, particularly mortgage lending"-
Congress enacted two statutes, the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act ("HMDA) 15 and the CRA. 16
Although they were both creatures of civil rights agitation,
neither HMDA nor the CRA prohibit any particular conduct, let
alone bar discrimination based on race. Instead, HMDA
promotes transparency with respect to bank mortgage lending
practices by requiring lenders to report certain demographic and
economic information about borrowers who apply for and are
either granted or denied loans.17 Similarly, the CRA does not
prohibit any particular acts, nor does it bar racial or any other
discrimination in financial institution practices. Instead, by its
express terms, federal bank regulators are to use their authority
"to encourage [financial] institutions to help meet the credit
needs of the local communities in which they are chartered," and
this goal is to be carried out "consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such institutions."18 The "local communities" in
which banks are chartered are supposed to include "low- and
moderate-income [communities] ."19
14 See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN:
How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 108 (2004) (defining redlining as "declining
to lend in minority neighborhoods, discouraging mortgage loan applications from
minority areas, and marketing policies that exclude such areas"). On the origins of
redlining, see KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES, 197-98 (1985); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51-52,
197-98 (1993); Adam Gordon, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal
Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to
Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 189 (2005).
15 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1124 (1975)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (2012)). For an overview of this act
and its legislative history, see Nat'l State Bank, Elizabeth, N.J. v. Long, 630 F.2d
981, 984, 986 (3d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
16 Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111
(1977) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2012)). For an overview of
the CRA and its legislative history, see RICHARD D. MARSICO, DEMOCRATIZING
CAPITAL: THE HISTORY, LAW, AND REFORM OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
11-28 (2005).
17 12 U.S.C. § 2803.
18 Id. § 2901(b) (emphasis added).
'" Id. § 2903(a)(1). The CRA regulations define "income levels" of different
communities as follows:
(1) Low-income, which means an individual income that is less than 50
percent of the area median income, or a median family income that is less
than 50 percent, in the case of a geography.
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To carry out this mandate, federal bank regulators 2° enforce
the CRA first by undertaking periodic examinations of covered
banks' activities in their local communities, including low- and
moderate-income communities." At the conclusion of these
examinations, banks are given one of four grades based on each
bank's relative success in "meeting community credit needs":
"outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs to improve," or "substantial
noncompliance."22 Second, regulators then take those grades into
account when they consider covered banks' applications to
engage in certain types of activities, like requests to merge or
open new bank branches.23
When conducting the periodic CRA examinations, regulators
evaluate different types of banks along different criteria. For
large retail banks, 24 regulators conduct a three-part review,
assessing such institutions' lending, investment, and service in
(2) Moderate-income, which means an individual income that is at least 50
percent and less than 80 percent of the area median income, or a median
family income that is at least 50 and less than 80 percent, in the case of a
geography.
(3) Middle-income, which means an individual income that is at least 80
percent and less than 120 percent of the area median income, or a median
family income that is at least 80 and less than 120 percent, in the case of a
geography.
(4) Upper-income, which means an individual income that is 120 percent or
more of the area median income, or a median family income that is 120
percent or more, in the case of a geography.
12 C.F.R. § 25.12(m)(1)-(4) (2014) (emphasis added).
20 According to the statute:
(1) the term "appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency" means-
(A) the Comptroller of the Currency with respect to national banks and
Federal savings associations (the deposits of which are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation);
(B) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with respect to
State chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System,
bank holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies;
(C) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with respect to State
chartered banks and savings banks which are not members of the Federal
Reserve System and the deposits of which are insured by the Corporation,
and State savings associations (the deposits of which are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
12 U.S.C. § 2902(1)(A)-(C).
21 Id. § 2903(a)(1).
22 Id. § 2906(b)(2)(A)-(D).
23 Id. § 2903(a)(2).
24 Retail banks with more than $1.202 billion in assets are considered large
banks. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.12(u)(1).
20141
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their respective CRA assessment areas.2 5 For wholesale and
limited purpose banks, regulators evaluate such banks under the
community development test, through which they look at such
banks' "community development lending, qualified investments,
or community development services."26 Intermediate, small
banks, and small retail banks are assessed under somewhat less
rigorous standards."
While the legislative history makes clear that Congress, in
passing the CRA, was concerned about the exclusion of minority
communities from traditional banking services,28 the CRA itself
only explicitly addresses the extension of banking services to low-
and moderate-income communities, 29 and does not specify that
the CRA promotes activities in communities of color expressly.
Upon passing the CRA, Congress was attempting to address
two related problems: redlining-excluding certain
neighborhoods from capital investment by banks-and capital
exportation-receiving deposits from one community and
investing those funds in other communities." While ensuring
that banks covered by the CRA meet the banking needs of low-
and moderate-income communities, Congress made quite clear
that the CRA did not mandate any particular lending quotas in
such communities.3 At the same time, legislators saw the CRA
as an explicit quid pro quo with banks for the governmental
support banks receive, like charters and federal deposit
insurance.32
Further reinforcing the fact that there is a clear connection
between the CRA and federal deposit insurance, an essential
feature of the CRA is that it only covers "regulated financial
25 Id. §§ 25.21(a)(1), (b), .22(a)(1), .23(c), .24(a).
26 Id. § 25.25(a).
27 See Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The
Financial Crisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. REV. 617, 634-35
(2009).
28 See 123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
29 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (2012).
30 See Brescia, supra note 27, at 630.
3' SENATOR PROXMIRE, COMM. ON BANKING, Hous., & URBAN AFFAIRS,
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1977, S. REP. No. 95-175, at 35
(1977) (rejecting notion that the CRA requires allocation of credit).
32 For a discussion of this connection between bank benefits and their CRA
obligations, see Barr, supra note 12, at 616-24; Allen J. Fishbein, The Community
Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but Strengthened Federal
Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 293 (1993).
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institutions,"33 which are described as "insured depository
institution[s] ."34 Thus, many stand-alone mortgage lenders-the
type of lender that engaged in much of the subprime lending in
the last decade-are typically not covered by the CRA.35 While
some non-bank subsidiaries of covered parent banks can be
covered by the Act, this is only at each parent bank's discretion. 6
Thus, if a parent bank wants to receive CRA "credit" for the
actions of its non-depository subsidiaries, it can choose to have
those activities reviewed as part of its CRA examination, or it can
choose to place such activities beyond the scope of the CRA. The
decision to choose to include or exclude a given parent bank's
subsidiary from its own CRA review will likely hinge on whether
the parent considers that subsidiary's activities in the parent's
CRA assessment areas to be consistent with the purposes of the
Act.
This connection between the original goals of the CRA and
the scope of CRA coverage is made apparent further by the focus
of the CRA on those communities in which banks have their
branches and engage in a substantial amount of their lending.
Banks covered by the CRA must undergo CRA review based on
those banks' activities within their respective "assessment
3 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1), (3).
34 Id. § 2902(2). The CRA adopts the definition of "insured depository
institution" set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (2012), which provides that such an
institution is "any bank or savings association the deposits of which are insured by
the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation." Id. § 1813(c)(2).
35 A question arises about the extent to which it was stand-alone mortgage
lenders-not covered by the CRA-or subsidiaries of full-service financial
institutions-covered at the discretion of the parent bank-that engaged in the
riskiest subprime lending. The Canner & Bhutta study found that roughly half of
"higher priced loans"-the Federal Reserve's proxy for subprime loans-were
originated by stand-alone mortgage lenders. Canner & Bhutta, supra note 5, at 7
tbl.2. That study also identified just six percent of subprime loans that were
originated at the height of the subprime mortgage frenzy by covered banks or their
subsidiaries acting within their CRA assessment areas. So, fully ninety-four percent
of subprime loans during this period were made by stand-alone mortgage lenders, or
by banks or their affiliates acting outside of those banks' respective CRA assessment
areas. Id. at 3. This six percent figure likely overstates the percentage of loans
covered by the CRA because loans subsidiaries of CRA-covered institutions are only
covered by the CRA at the parent bank's discretion.
36 12 C.F.R. § 25.22(c)(1) (2014). For a discussion of the parent bank option to
include or exclude the activites of subsidiaries in its CRA review, see Richard D.
Marsico, Subprime Lending, Predatory Lending, and the Community Reinvestment
Act Obligations of Banks, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 735, 738-39 (2003) (citing 12 C.F.R.
§ 25.22(a)(1), (c)(1)).
2014]
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areas."37  The banks determine these assessment areas
themselves, but the regulators review the areas for consistency
with the purposes of the CRA.8  For most banks,39 the
assessment area or areas delineated must include the
communities "in which the bank has its main office, its branches,
and its deposit-taking ATMs," as well as those communities
where the bank has "originated or purchased a substantial
portion of its loans."40
This alignment between the goals of the CRA-preventing
redlining and capital exportation by tying CRA coverage of
depository institutions acting within their assessment areas-
actually reveals, in part, the mismatch between the CRA and the
riskiest lending during the subprime mortgage frenzy, as further
discussed in Part II.B. Put simply, when financial institutions
acting beyond the scope of the CRA carried out so much of the
subprime lending in the last decade-either because the lenders
were not covered by it, or because the subprime activity was not
undertaken in a relevant CRA assessment area-it is hard to
argue that the CRA was responsible for the type of risky lending
that led to the financial crisis.
These gaps in CRA coverage ultimately exposed many
communities to a range of predatory conduct, which ultimately
had devastating economic and social effects. Part II outlines the
extent to which the communities the CRA was designed to
protect are those that have experienced some of the harshest
consequences of the fallout from the foreclosure crisis of the late
2000s.
37 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(b).
"8 Regulators review the assessment area delineation simply for its consistency
with the purposes of the CRA. Id. § 25.41(a).
39 The rules for wholesale or limited purpose banks are slightly different than
those for other types of financial institutions. See id. § 25.41(b).
40 Id. § 25.41(c)(2).
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II. THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON Low- AND
MODERATE-INCOME COMMUNITIES AND THE GAPS IN THE CRA
THAT FAILED To PREVENT THIS IMPACT
A. The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Low- and Moderate-
Income Communities
The subprime mortgage crisis took a particularly hard toll on
low- and moderate-income communities and communities of
color. Since a disproportionate share of subprime lending was
concentrated in communities of color, when the subprime crisis
hit, it hit hardest in those communities. And since a
disproportionate percentage of low- and moderate-income
communities are also communities of color, this disproportionate
impact on communities of color also hit communities of lower
income harder. In 2005, roughly half of conventional home
purchase loans made to black families and Latino families had
subprime features, while just 17.2% of conventional mortgages to
non-Hispanic whites had such features.4 A legacy of lending
discrimination in such communities meant that subprime lenders
could thrive in these communities,42 where there were fewer
traditional banking opportunities.43 Where there were more
subprime loans, there tended to be more foreclosures, and
foreclosures have a measurable adverse impact on the
communities in which they occur.44 Home prices that soared
came down considerably and foreclosures displaced a large
percentage of residents.45
41 Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA
Data, 92 FED. RES. BULL., 2006, at A159-A160 tbl.13.
42 For a history of housing discrimination, see DAN IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO
THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 87-108 (2004). See also Gordon, supra note 14, at 209-11
(discussing how the regulatory system denied most African-Americans the
opportunity to buy homes).
4 U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 18 (2000), available at http://www.hud
user.orglPublications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf.
See Gregory D. Squires, Urban Development and Unequal Access to Housing
Finance Services, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255, 263 (2008-2009) (citing David Cho &
Nell Henderson, Where the Wolf Comes Knocking; Areas Already in Economic
Distress Feel Rise in Housing Foreclosures Most, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2007, at D1).
45 See, e.g., Lynn Fisher et al., A Profile of the Mortgage Crisis in a Low-and-
Moderate-Income Community 1, 8 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. Pub. Policy Discussion
Papers, Working Paper No. 10-6, 2010), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/
2014]
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Recent studies have attempted to measure the impact of
foreclosures on the value of neighboring properties. One study in
Chicago in the late 1990s showed a reduction in the value of
single-family homes within one-eighth of a mile of a foreclosed
home by 0.9% to 1.136% for each such foreclosure.46
Furthermore, each foreclosed property reduced the value of
neighboring properties by between $159,000 and $371,000. 41
Early studies of the current foreclosure crisis predicted a range of
losses to homeowners nationally at between $356 billion and $1.2
trillion in home values.4  A more recent study by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta found that property values in the late
2000s, on average, were reduced by no more than one percent
due to nearby foreclosures, and they attributed at least some of
that reduction to disinvestment in properties in foreclosure and
delays in the foreclosure process.49
Now that the evidence, for the most part, is in, it is easier to
assess the full impact of the financial crisis on American
homeowners, and the reality of the losses far exceeds the early
predictions. Indeed, a recent study by the General Accounting
Office estimates the loss of homeowner equity in the United
States as a result of the crisis at $9.1 trillion. 50 A study of the
impacts of foreclosures on African-American and Latino
communities indicates that these losses are disproportionately
economic/ppdp/2010/ppdpl006.pdf (noting the impact of financial crisis on one low-
and moderate-income community in Massachusetts).
4 DAN IMMERGLUCK & GEOFF SMITH, THERE GOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD: THE
EFFECT OF SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES ON PROPERTY VALUES 9
(2005), available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
TGTNReport%20%281%29_0.pdf.
41 Id. at 11.
4 Compare THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: STATES
RESPOND TO AMERICA'S FORECLOSURE CRISIS 10 (2008), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2008/04/16/defaulting-
on-the-dream-states-respond-to-americas-foreclosure-crisis (predicting a $356 billion
loss in home value due to rise in foreclosures), with GLOBAL INSIGHT, U.S. METRO
ECONOMIES: THE MORTGAGE CRISIS 2 (2007), available at http://www.usmayors.org/
metroeconomies/1107/report.pdf (predicting a $1.2 trillion total loss in home values
due to the subprime mortgage crisis).
41 Kristopher Gerardi et al., Foreclosure Externalities: Some New Evidence 4,
13-14, 33 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
2012-11, 2012), available at http'//www.frbatlanta.org/documents/pubs/wp/wp
1211.pdf.
50 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM: FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK
ACT 21 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651322.pdf.
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found in these communities, and, the greater the segregation in
such communities-that is, the higher the percentage of
residents of color in a community-the greater those impacts.51
In addition to the impacts of foreclosures on home prices, the
financial crisis has taken a heavy toll on unemployment,
particularly among the low-skilled and those with a lower level of
educational attainment.52  Moreover, small business lending
contracted after the financial crisis, particularly in low- and
moderate-income communities and African-American
communities. 8
Congress clearly passed the CRA to protect low- and
moderate-income communities. Yet it is these communities that
have suffered some of the harshest consequences of the financial
crisis. The severe impacts on such communities raise questions
about the effectiveness of the CRA in fulfilling its most critical
functions. The following discussion explores some of these
phenomena.
B. The Gaps in the CRA That Failed To Prevent These Impacts
While some have raised concerns that the CRA played a role
in fueling the subprime crisis, a larger question, perhaps, looms
in the background: Why did the CRA fail to serve as a bulwark
against the very harms it was designed to prevent? So, if the
question is what role did the CRA play in the financial crisis,
perhaps the appropriate inquiry is not to ask whether it was too
strong, but whether it was strong enough. As the following
discussion shows, the many gaps in the CRA's coverage, the weak
enforcement of it by regulators, and the absence of a private right
of action to enforce its terms lead one to the firm conclusion that
the CRA was not too strong, but too weak. The main role it may
"' Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American
Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 644, 645 tbl.5 (2010).
52 Michael Hirsh & Fawn Johnson, In the High-Skilled Economy, Low-Skilled
Workers Fall Behind, ATLANTIC (Aug. 3, 2011, 11:15 AM), http://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/08/in-the-high-skilled-economy-low-skilled-
workers-fall-behind/243012/.
- Elizabeth Laderman & Carolina Reid, The Community Reinvestment Act and
Small Business Lending in.Low- and Moderate-Income Neighborhoods During the
Financial Crisis 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F. Cmty. Dev., Working Paper No. 2010-
05, 2010), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/wpapers/2010/
wp2010-05.pdf.
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have played in the financial crisis was that it failed to live up to
its promise; it failed to protect low- and moderate-income
communities from predatory conduct.
1. Scope of the CRA
Research conducted by the Federal Reserve reveals that in
2005-2006, only six percent of all higher-priced loans-the
Federal Reserve's proxy for subprime loans-were subject to the
CRA.5 4 The reason for this gap in coverage is four-fold. First, as
discussed above, the CRA does not cover non-depository
institutions.55 Second, it does not cover lending by covered
institutions outside of their designated CRA assessment areas.56
Third, it only covers the activities of non-depository subsidiaries
of covered banks at the discretion of the parent institution.57
Finally, loans made to borrowers who are not of low or moderate
income are also beyond the reach of the CRA.58 Given these gaps
in CRA coverage, the overwhelming majority of the riskiest
loans-fully ninety-four percent of them-was beyond its scope,
and carried out beyond its protections.59
2. Weak Enforcement
Beyond the gaps in CRA coverage, the history of bank
regulator enforcement of the CRA indicates that few banks ever
received any kind of punishment for failing to honor the CRA's
goals. By the late 2000s, roughly ninety-eight percent of banks
54 Canner & Bhutta, supra note 5, at 3. As the authors of this study note, the six
percent figure might actually overstate the number of subprime loans that the CRA
covers. That study counted loans made by subsidiaries regardless of whether such
subsidiaries were included in the parent bank's CRA examination.
" See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(c)(2), 2902(1) (2012). For a comparison of the different
regulatory structures for depository and nondepository institutions, see Patricia A.
McCoy & Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and
Nontraditional Home Mortgages, in BORROWING To LIVE: CONSUMER AND
MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 110, 122-25 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belskey
eds., 2008).
5Cf 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(a) (2014) (describing how a regulated entity's
assessment area is established for the purpose of CRA review).
57 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory
Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1588-89 (2002).
m Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Confronting Concentrated Poverty Policy Forum: The Community
Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 3, 2008), available at
httpJ/www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner2008l2O3a.htm.
59 Canner & Bhutta, supra note 5, at 3.
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received either an "outstanding" or "satisfactory" score as a result
of their respective CRA examinations. ° Apart from these high
grades, the chances of a denial of a bank application on CRA
grounds were minute, at best. Between 1985 through 1999, less
than 0.8%--692 out of 92,177-of bank applications subject to the
CRA received any adverse comment, either on CRA or other
grounds.6 ' Only eight applications of those 692 were denied for
any reason, with four percent of the 692 withdrawn by the bank,
and one percent returned.62 Ultimately, just eight applications
out of 92,177 were denied on any grounds--or less than .01% of
all bank applications-during this fifteen-year period. 3 Of the
more than 13,000 applications filed before the Federal Reserve
from 1988 through May 2007, only eight of them, less than .06%,
were denied on grounds described as "unsatisfactory consumer
protection and community needs issues."64 With so few bank
applications denied by bank regulators on CRA grounds, critics of
the CRA are hard pressed to show how such weak enforcement
could induce banks to do much of anything. In a strict cost-
benefit analysis, if the risk of punishment under the Act is so
low, classical economic theory suggests that compliance with the
law in such circumstances will also be low.6"
3. No Private Right of Action
In the wake of the financial crisis, federal and state law
enforcement officials and private litigants have used the courts
and the threat of civil litigation and criminal prosecution to
ameliorate some of the harshest consequences of the financial
crisis, and to remedy some of the riskiest behavior that led to it.
Litigation and enforcement in the wake of the financial crisis
60 The Community Reinvestment Act: Thirty Years of Accomplishments, but
Challenges Remain: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 194
(2008) (statement of John Taylor, President and CEO, Nat'l Cmty. Reinvestment
Coal.).
61 Barr, supra note 12, at 586.
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 Foreclosures at the Front Step of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight &
Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 63-64 (2007) (statement of Sandra Braunstein, Dir., Div.
of Consumer and Cmty. Affairs).
I For an articulation of this theory, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170 (1968).
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bears all of the hallmarks of "mass torts" litigation.6 In
particular, legal proceedings have included sweeping
enforcement actions and civil litigation that utilize procedural
mechanisms to bring relief to wide classes of victims.6 7  In the
last five years, through court action and its threat, banks have
paid out tens of billions of dollars for a range of illegal practices,
both in the lead up to and the aftermath of the crisis. In 2008,
Bank of America agreed to pay out over $8 billion in damages to
borrowers impacted by the predatory subprime practices of its
subsidiary, Countrywide Financial.68  Last year, five of the
largest banks agreed to pay $25 billion for flawed foreclosure
practices, which included, among other things, fabricating
documents and forging court submissions. 9 In a series of cases
alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, banks like Wells
Fargo and smaller lenders agreed to damage awards and loan
commitments of nearly $500 million.7 ° Such outcomes are just
the tip of the iceberg, however, as pending actions seek hundreds
of billions of dollars in damages against many of the largest
banks for improper conduct in the lead up to the financial crisis. 71
The CRA has been largely outside of this trend towards court
and law enforcement intervention regarding the causes of the
financial crisis. In the late 1990s, courts foreclosed much hope
that private litigants could enforce the CRA through the courts.
In Lee v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 72 and
6 See Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Torts Approach
in Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009).
7 See id. at 13-17; see also Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half
Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation,
73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1596 (1995) (describing hallmarks of mass torts litigation).
I Joel Rosenblatt, Angelo Mozilo Settles Lending Suit for $6.5 Million
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2011, 7:34 PM), http'J/www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aWdK8sUCOLfO&refer=home.
69 Loren Berlin & Emily Peck, National Mortgage Settlement: States, Big Banks
Reach $25 Billion Deal, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2012, 6:10 PM), http'/
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/national-mortgage-settlement_n_1265292.html.
70 Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2012, at B3.
71 See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Kevin Roose, Federal Regulators Sue Big
Banks over Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.comI2011/
09/03/business/bank-suits-over-mortgages-are-filed.html?_r=0 (describing lawsuits
by Federal Housing Finance Administration seeking nearly $200 billion in damages
for sale of mortgage backed securities).
72 118 F.3d 905 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Lee v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,73 both court
challenges filed by community members to transactions approved
by bank regulators despite CRA-based objections, the courts left
little doubt that the CRA in its current form is unenforceable by
private litigants through the courts, holding that the plaintiffs
had no standing to sue, and that the CRA itself provided few
standards for courts to enforce. 4
A CRA that is narrow in scope, suffered from anemic
enforcement, and did not offer private parties the ability to
enforce it through the courts, failed to prevent some of the
harshest effects of the financial crisis from befalling low- and
moderate-income communities. Some critics of the CRA suggest,
however, that the CRA was so strong that it led banks to engage
in risky lending, the type of lending that ultimately brought
about these harms. The following discussion attempts to sort
through the best available research on the subject to determine
the extent to which CRA-related lending was, in fact, connected
to risky lending and its consequences.
III. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CRA AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS
Several studies have attempted to assess the impact of the
CRA on risky lending in the lead up to the financial crisis. Some
have also attempted to chart the positive impact the CRA has
had on increasing access to capital on fair terms in low- and
moderate-income communities. Most of these studies, as
described below, have showed a positive impact from the CRA on
such communities and little negative impact, if any, from lending
pursued under the CRA. Indeed, most studies establish that
lending carried out under the CRA tended to perform better than
that which was carried out beyond its reach.75 Additionally,
several studies find little connection between CRA-eligible
lending and the defaults and foreclosures that helped to fuel the
foreclosure crisis and the financial crisis that followed. One
recent report tends to contradict these other studies, however. A
recent study released by researchers affiliated with the National
, No. 95 Civ. 7963(LMM), 1997 WL 570545, at *1, *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15,
1997).
74 In addition to the cases described above, other courts have reached similar
conclusions. See Brescia, supra note 27, at 654 n.206 (reviewing cases and holdings).
76 See infra Part III.A.
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Bureau of Economic Research ("NBER") attempted to test the
effect of CRA examinations on risky lending and found a
statistically significant increase in riskier lending by banks
around the time of their respective examinations. The following
Sections review the prior research that tended to find no CRA
effect on the financial crisis, as well as the recent NBER
research. They also attempt to point out some of the
methodological and interpretive flaws in the NBER study.
A. Prior Studies That Show No Impact of the CRA on the
Financial Crisis
For more than the last decade, several studies establish that
the CRA had a positive effect on low- and moderate-income
communities by bringing desperately needed financial services to
such previously underserved areas. 76  A two-part study carried
out jointly by the Brookings Institution and the Joint Center for
Housing Studies at Harvard University found that the CRA was
likely responsible for "nearly $620 billion in home mortgage,
small business, and community development loans to low- and
moderate-income borrowers and communities."77 Another study
carried out by the same Harvard center compared the
performance of CRA-covered banks acting within their CRA
assessment areas, CRA-covered banks acting outside of their
CRA assessment areas, and financial institutions not covered by
the CRA.7" The results of that study showed that the strongest
lending carried out in low- and moderate-income communities
76 See, e.g., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., THE 25TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN AN
EVOLVING FINANCIAL SERVICES SYSTEM iv (2002) [hereinafter 25TH ANNIVERSARY
REPORT], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sitesjchs.harvard.edu/filescra02-
L.pdf; Douglas D. Evanoff & Lewis M. Segal, CRA and Fair Lending Regulations:
Resulting Trends in Mortgage Lending, 20 ECON. PERSP. 19, 19, 38 (1996), available
at httpJ/www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/economic-perspectives/1996/
epnd96b.pdf (showing the CRA and fair lending enforcement increased lending to
minority communities).
" See Barr, supra note 12, at 566 (citing ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL
MODERNIZATION: A BASELINE REPORT, at ES-5, ES-14, ES-16 (2000), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/cra-report-2000.pdf); LITAN
ET AL., supra, at ES-11; see also Eric S. Belsky et al., The Effect of the Community
Reinvestment Act on Bank and Thrift Home Purchase Mortgage Lending 1 (Harvard
Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. CRA01-1, 2001), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/belschllyezer-craOl-1.pdf.
78 25TH ANNIVERSARY REPORT, supra note 76, at 48, 53 exhibit 19.
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was that done by banks acting within their CRA assessment
areas. That is, loans made by banks within their respective
assessment areas performed better than loans made by non-CRA
banks in those areas, and even better than loans made by the
same banks but to borrowers outside of those assessment areas.79
Another study that assessed the impact of changes to the
CRA regulations in 1995 and stronger CRA enforcement after
those changes were made posited that strengthened regulations
and enforcement may have reduced the gap in the
homeownership rate between blacks and whites between 1995
and 1997.0
Research carried out by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, studying loan performance in 2005-
2006, showed that CRA-related loans were half as likely to be
delinquent on their mortgage payments as subprime loans not
covered by the CRA.8 1 This study analyzed the impact of CRA
lending on foreclosures in 2008 and found that non-CRA
subprime loans were twenty times more likely to end up in
foreclosure than loans made through a CRA-related program. 2
Similarly, the Center for Community Capital at the
University of North Carolina ("CCC") compared the performance
of a lending program qualifying for CRA credit against the
performance of subprime loans during the height of subprime
mortgage activity and found that the CRA-related lending
performed far better than subprime loans, even though the risk
profiles of the borrowers in the program matched those generally
of borrowers in the subprime market. In its study Risky
Borrowers or Risky Mortgages: Disaggregating Effects Using
Propensity Score Models ("Risky Borrowers study"), the CCC
assessed the performance of loans in the Community Advantage
Program ("CAP"), a CRA-related lending program'developed by
19 Id. at 51-53.
80 Lewis M. Segal & Daniel G. Sullivan, Trends in Homeownership: Race,
Demographics, and Income, 22 ECON. PERSP. 53, 53, 68 (1998), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/economic-perspectives/1998/ep
2Q98_4.pdf.
81 Canner & Bhutta, supra note 5, at 5, 10 tbl.7 (finding that the delinquency
rate for loans offered through CRA-related programming was 9.36%, compared to a
delinquency rate for subprime loans of nearly twice that, or 18.21%).
82 Id.
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the North Carolina fair lending organization Self-Help.83 The
CAP program facilitated loans to borrowers whose credit profiles
reflected the credit profiles of borrowers typically found in the
subprime market.84 Given the similarity in profiles between the
borrowers in the CAP program and those in the subprime market
generally, the study could assess the impact of the CAP program
on loan performance, 5  while, essentially, controlling for
creditworthiness of the borrowers. 86  The study also looked at
loan performance in two groupings of loans, subprime and CAP
program loans originated in both the 2003-2004 period and a
second group originated in 2005-2006. In the first time period,
subprime loans defaulted at a rate four times that of loans in the
CAP program.88  During the second time period, the cumulative
default rate for the subprime loans was nearly half of all loans-
47.5%.89 This figure was over 3.5 times the rate for comparable
CAP loans during the same time period-13.3%. °
Research carried out by the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco that looked at lending during the height of the
subprime market found results similar to previous studies. First,
it found that lending carried out by CRA-covered institutions
performed much better than that carried out by non-CRA covered
institutions. Second, lending by CRA-covered institutions within
their CRA assessment areas proved much more stable than loans
made by non-CRA covered institutions, and proved even more
stable than loans made by those CRA-covered institutions but
outside their CRA assessment areas. 9'
83 See generally Lei Ding et al., Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages:
Disaggregating Effects Using Propensity Score Models, 33 J. REAL EST. RES. 245, 251
(2011), available at http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/jrer/papers/pdf/pastvo133n02/
05.245_278.pdf.
'4 See id. at 246, 248, 250.
8,5 Id. at 254.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 252, 263-64.
88 Id. at 265 ("The estimated cumulative default rate for a 2004 subprime loan is
16.8%, about four times that of CAP loans (4.2%).").
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Elizabeth Laderman & Carolina Reid, Lending in Low- and Moderate-Income
Communities in California: The Performance of CRA Lending During the Subprime
Meltdown 14-16, 19-20 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F. Cmty. Dev., Working Paper No.




Moreover, as stated earlier, the subprime mortgage market
was generally overwhelmingly dominated by loans originated
beyond the reach of the CRA, either because they were extended
by institutions not covered by it, or made outside of covered
institution's CRA assessment areas. As one study conducted for
the Federal Reserve shows,92 at least ninety-four percent of
subprime loans were originated by financial institutions acting
beyond the scope of the CRA, either because they were carried
out by stand-alone mortgage lenders not covered by the CRA, or
were made by covered banks acting outside their CRA
assessment areas or to individuals who were not of low or
moderate income.93 With fully ninety-four percent of subprime
loans being originated outside of the CRA, it is hard to argue that
the CRA could have had much effect on the type of lending that
probably played the most significant part in helping to bring
about the foreclosure crisis.
B. Recent Research Purports To Show an Increase in Risky
Lending Due to the CRA
Despite the consistent findings of the studies described
above-that the CRA likely did not lead banks to engage in the
riskier lending that helped to lead to the subprime mortgage
crisis-a recent study94 conducted under the auspices of the
NBER reached a different conclusion.
1. Overview of the Report and Findings
The NBER study looked at lending by banks between 1999
and 2009. It compared the lending practices of banks that were
undergoing periodic CRA examinations with those that were not,
specifically looking at bank practices during the six quarters
surrounding a CRA examination-three quarters before the
examination, and three after.95 It studied lending by banks to
low- and moderate-income communities and low- and moderate-
income borrowers. It called these low- and moderate-income
communities "CRA-eligible tracts"96 and the study focused on the
lending behavior of banks in such tracts, comparing the lending
92 See generally Canner & Bhutta, supra note 5.
93 Id. at 3.
94 See generally Agarwal et al., supra note 9.
91 Id. at 16 n.17.
Id. at 3.
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activity of banks that were having examinations and those that
were not.9 By comparing bank performance in such tracts
around the time of their CRA examination to the performance of
banks not being examined, the researchers hoped to identify and
measure what, if any, effect the CRA examination process had on
bank behavior-that is, they sought to explore whether the fact
that a bank was undergoing a CRA examination led it to engage
in riskier lending around the time of the examination in the hope
of improving its performance on the CRA examination.
The researchers found that banks undergoing CRA
examinations tended to approve loans at a higher rate in CRA-
eligible tracts-a roughly five percent higher rate-than banks
not undergoing such examinations,9 and the period when this
was most pronounced was in the 2004-2006 time frame. 9 These
discrepancies tended to disappear in banks with assets between
$1 billion and $50 billion.' ° The study also showed that the
delinquency rate of loans made in CRA-eligible tracts by
examined banks was somewhat higher than the rate for loans
made by non-examined banks in similar tracts.1 ' It must be
pointed out, however, that the finding of increased delinquencies
is arguably misleading in the following sense. As the researchers
point out, the general delinquency rate of the loans in examined
banks was slightly more than one percent-1.2% to be precise. 0 2
Loans by banks undergoing examinations had a delinquency rate
that was 0.1% higher than banks not undergoing
examinations. 10 3 Loans in CRA-eligible tracts had a delinquency
rate that was 0.4% higher than the general delinquency rate. 10 4
9' Id. at 24.
" Id. at 14.
9 Id. at 22.
'O Id. at 17.
101 Id. at 18.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 To quote the NBER study:
[L]oans made in the quarter following the initiation of a CRA exam to
borrowers in non-CRA-target tracts have a 0.1 percentage point higher 90-
day delinquency rate as compared to loans made by control group banks.
This effect is economically large, representing an 8.3 percent increase in
the average 90-day delinquency rate of 1.2 percent. The equivalent effect in
CRA-target tracts is even more pronounced: in these tracts, loans made in
the quarter following the initiation of a CRA exam have a 0.4 percentage
point higher delinquency rate, representing a 33 percent increase compared
to the average 90-day delinquency rate.
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Finally, the study showed one discrepancy in loan quality
between banks undergoing examinations and banks not
undergoing such examinations. While many of the
characteristics of loans made by examined banks and
unexamined banks were similar-for example, they had similar
loan-to-value ratios and borrower credit scores-there tended to
be more low-documentation loans in CRA examined banks in
CRA-eligible tracts compared to non-examined banks.' °5 Based
on these findings, the researchers conclude that the CRA led
banks to engage in risky lending. 106
2. Critiques of the Report
According to the researchers, the main conclusions to draw
from the research are that larger banks-banks with assets over
$50 billion-tended to engage in elevated lending to what the
researchers call CRA-eligible tracts in the period surrounding a
CRA examination, especially during the 2004-2006 time frame,
and that the loans made around the time of the CRA
examination tended to default at a higher rate than those loans
issued by banks not undergoing CRA examinations. There are
several questions raised by the NBER report's methodology,
however, and each is discussed, in turn, below.
a. Dubious Time Frame
First, this report attempts to gauge the impact of a CRA
examination by looking at lending by banks in a time frame that
represents the six quarters surrounding each bank's CRA
examination-that is, the three quarters immediately preceding
the quarter in which the examination occurs and the three
quarters following it.' 07 This time frame appears to bear little
relation to the time frame bank regulators assess when they
conduct CRA examinations, however. For example, there is a lag
of up to fourteen months between when a loan decision is made
and when banks must report their HMDA data to regulators.0 8
Id. Even this thirty-three percent increase represents an increase in the delinquency
rate from 1.2% to 1.6%.
105 Id. at 19.
106 Id. at 24.
107 Id. at 16 n.17.
o Financial institutions that must report HMDA data must do so by March 1 of
the year after which the data was compiled; thus some data, such as data from
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Additionally, there is typically a lag in the release of the analysis
of HMDA data as well. It is usually released roughly nine
months after the year in which it is reported-that is, up to seven
quarters after the first data reported in the previous year is
tabulated by the banks. 10 9 Moreover, regulators typically take a
retrospective look at bank records when conducting CRA
examinations, including all information regarding bank practices
since the bank's last examination. In other words, regulators do
not just review recent activities of the banks."0  It is not a
"rolling" process, as the NBER study appears to presume."'
Finally, depending on the time lag between an
announcement of an examinaton and when the examination is
actually conducted, the announcement of a CRA examination
cannot result in a retrospective change in bank behavior, as this
study seems to contemplate. That is, by assessing bank behavior
in the three quarters prior to a CRA examination, the
researchers seem to believe that there is at least a three-quarter
lag between the announcement of an examination and the
examination itself. The study offers no basis for such an
assumption. Without the facts to support such an assumption, it
is difficult to claim that bank behavior preceding a CRA
examination-for three quarters no less-will change once banks
are made aware that the regulators have scheduled an
examination.
January of the previous year, is not reported until fourteen months after it is
compiled by the banks. 12 C.F.R. § 203.5(a)(1) (2014).
'o See Press Release, Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council Announces Availability of 2011 Data on Mortgage
Lending (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr091812.htm
(announcing the release of the 2011 HMDA data).
110 The examination period typically includes all relevant activities by the
examined bank since its last examination. Regulators do not stress the months
immediately before or after an announced examination in their assessment. See, e.g.,
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ADM'R OF NAT'L BANKS, LARGE BANK CRA
EXAMINER GUIDANCE 7 (2000), available at httpJ/www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/bulletins/2000/bulletin-2000-35a.pdf (noting the examination period
includes all bank activities since the last examination).
"I One analysis of a sample of twenty banks showed that the period assessed by
the regulators typically closed six months prior to the examination data. CAROLINA
REID ET AL., UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, DEBUNKING THE CRA MYTH - AGAIN 5-




Thus, this study attempts to identify some sort of "CRA
effect" by assessing bank behavior before and after CRA
examinations, but it is unclear that the time frame selected for
this review bears any relation to the ways that the scheduling of
CRA examinations might impact bank behavior. It is hard to
argue that a review of loan origination and performance outside
the same time frame that the regulators review in the CRA
examination process yields information that might indicate how
banks might change their behavior in the shadow of that process.
b. Bank Behavior Analyzed
Second, this study looks only at the "acceptance rates" of
loans, not at loan volume.112 Looking only at the acceptance rate
of loans using HMDA data says little about whether a bank has
originated more loans. It just means that it has accepted more of
the applications that have been made to it. A bank can have a
100% acceptance rate of the loan applications submitted to it,
and yet make just one loan. What would be far more instructive
when assessing whether there is some CRA effect would be to
determine loan volume: both the number of loans and the
average and total amount of those loans. Just looking at
acceptance rates says little about whether the CRA encouraged
more net lending, either in terms of loan volume or loan amount.
c. Loan Quality
Third, just as an elevated acceptance rate, standing alone,
says little about loan volume, it also says nothing about loan
quality, whether that quality is measured by the terms of the
loan, the creditworthiness of the borrower, or the performance of
that loan. In other words, even assuming that an elevated
acceptance rate reflects more net lending, and there is nothing in
the NBER study that appears to support such a proposition, in
order for any CRA effect to be harmful, the study would have to
indicate that there is something about the elevated acceptance
rate to give pause, whether in terms of the quality of this
elevated lending or something else. Here, the NBER study
reveals shaky evidence, at best, that the elevated lending it
112 See, e.g., Agarwal et al., supra note 9, at 31 tbl.2.
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identified was of poorer quality. The study explicitly recognizes
that loan terms and borrower characteristics were essentially
similar between examined banks and unexamined banks. 113
The one area where this study appears to find some
differences between examined banks and unexamined banks is in
terms of loan performance. Here, the findings raise similar
doubts about their relevance to the CRA examination process.
The study found increased delinquency rates in loans, most
notably in loans originated in the period after CRA examinations,
and, most particularly in the 2004-2006 time period."' But this
analysis overlooks several important points about the timing of
the examination in relation to the loans actually examined. The
CRA examination process "closes" before the examination is
conducted in terms of the loans the regulators will review during
that examination. In addition, there is a time lag in the
availability of HMDA data. Thus, the loan performance of loans
issued during or immediately after the CRA examination process
could not reflect a change of behavior of the examined banks in
relation to the CRA examination itself. In other words, if
regulators are not reviewing the lending that takes place
simultaneous to the CRA examination, it is hard to argue that
such lending has been influenced by the examination process.
d. Relevant Geographic Criteria
Apart from these questions-and regardless of whether they
identify methodological flaws or not-the report suffers from a
significant flaw, one that raises serious doubts about the study's
findings. The study substitutes "CRA-eligible" communities for
banks' respective CRA assessment areas. Its research analyzes
bank activities in the first, but the CRA only covers bank lending
in the second. While it is true that bank practices are assessed
under the CRA for their lending in low- and moderate-income
communities, it is not accurate to say that all of bank lending in
low- and moderate-income communities is assessed under the
CRA through the CRA examination process. This report looked
at lending in "CRA-eligible" communities, but fails to distinguish
whether all such lending took place within each bank's respective
CRA assessment areas. All low- and moderate-income
113 Id. at 3.
114 Id. at 22.
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communities are certainly CRA-eligible, but not all such
communities are found within every bank's CRA assessment
areas. Indeed, a bank can make risky loans in low- and
moderate-income communities but, generally, regulators will not
take such lending into account in a particular bank's CRA
examination if those communities are not located within that
bank's CRA assessment areas., 5  Again, a bank's CRA
assessment areas are those communities in which that bank has
branches, ATMs, or does a substantial amount of its lending. 1 6
Banks are free to make loans in other low- and moderate-income
communities and such lending will play little role in those banks'
CRA examinations. With modern banking practices, including
internet banking, and with mortgage brokers playing an outsized
role in the subprime mortgage market,1 7 it is quite easy for a
bank to engage in any kind of lending, let alone subprime
lending, outside of its particular CRA assessment areas. The
NBER research includes an extensive analysis of lending in what
the researchers call CRA-eligible communities, but no analysis
was done to ensure that all of the loans tested in the study were
in each lending bank's respective CRA assessment areas.
This design flaw means that the study includes loans that
were likely not a part of the regulators' review of the studied
banks' CRA performance. It is difficult to argue that loan
performance of non-CRA loans-even if to CRA "eligible"
communities-says anything about the impact that the CRA had
on bank behavior if lending to those communities was not a part
of a particular bank's CRA record. Indeed, without knowing
"I Although the regulations permit regulators to take into account some lending
to low- and moderate-income borrowers outside of a particular bank's assessment
areas, the heavy emphasis in the regulations is towards the lending and services
banks provide to their respective assessment areas, consistent with the Act's terms
themselves. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 345.22(b) (2014). And the statute and regulations
do not capture lending to higher income individuals in low- and moderate-income
communities if those communities are not within a given bank's CRA assessment
area.
116 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
117 Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 255 (2001)
(statement of Neill A. Fendly, CMC, Immediate Past President of Nat'l Ass'n of
Mortg. Brokers) (stating that half of subprime loans were originated by mortgage
brokers).
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which loans were actually a part of banks' CRA activities, it is
impossible to tell how the CRA may have affected bank behavior
and how it did not.
The failure to identify only bank activities covered by the
CRA means the outcomes the study found may bear no relation
to the influence the CRA had on banks. While it is entirely
possible that the bank lending to CRA-eligible communities the
study analyzed was all a part of each bank's CRA examination
and activities, it is also just as likely that it was not. And if the
bank lending this study reviewed was outside the CRA
examination process, that might say a great deal about the
impact of the CRA on bank behavior; it would just tell a very
different story about the impact of the CRA on banks. Indeed, if
it turns out that many of the riskier, non-performing loans were
made to CRA-eligible communities, yet those loans were not a
part of each lending bank's CRA review, it means that banks
were engaging in riskier loans outside their CRA activities-
beyond the reach of the CRA. That is, banks could have been
engaging in riskier practices precisely where the CRA did not
touch: low- and moderate-income communities not within each
bank's CRA assessment areas. If that were the case, then we
would know that the CRA provides protections to certain low-
and moderate-income communities, but leaves banks free to
impose heavier burdens on communities where CRA review will
not occur. As several previously cited studies showed, banks
otherwise covered by the CRA do appear to have engaged in
riskier lending outside of their CRA assessment areas compared
to within them. 118
Unfortunately, given the flaw in the design of this study, the
conclusion that those researchers drew-that the CRA had a
negative impact on bank behavior because banks apparently
responded, at least some banks, during at least one particular
time frame, to the fact that they were being examined under the
law by increasing the volume of risky loans in low- and moderate-
income communities" 9-is no more likely than the very different,
potential conclusion described above. That is, without clarifying
whether all so-called CRA-eligible tracts are also tracts within
the lending bank's CRA assessment area, it is just as possible
118 See, e.g., 25TH ANNIVERSARY REPORT, supra note 76, at 48; Laderman &
Reid, supra note 91, at 14-20.
119 See supra Part III.B.1.
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that the CRA led to riskier lending inside CRA assessment areas
as it led, perversely, to riskier lending outside of those areas. If
the researchers did, in fact, identify some degree of riskier
lending in low- and moderate-income communities, in order to
identify the CRA as a contributing factor in such lending, one
would need to ensure that all such lending took place within each
lending bank's respective CRA assessment areas.
If riskier lending did in fact occur, in order to blame the CRA
for it, one would need to show that such lending took place in
banks' assessment areas, not outside of them. Saying a loan was
originated in a low- or moderate-income community is not the
same as saying that it was made within a CRA assessment area.
Indeed, if risky lending took place inside a low- or moderate-
income community, yet that community was not within the
lending bank's CRA assessment area, that might suggest that
the bank was willing to engage in such risky lending in that
community precisely because it is not subject to CRA review-
because it is outside that bank's assessment area, and thus,
outside of regulator oversight under the CRA. Frankly, because
of the methodological flaw in this study, the data fail to point
definitely to either conclusion-that is, that the apparent riskier
lending the researchers identified occurred in light of the CRA, or
despite of it. Indeed, if the CRA led to riskier lending by banks
outside of the CRA's purview, it would appear that banks were
more willing to engage in riskier lending beyond the scope of the
CRA, not within it. Accordingly, by failing to identify only loans
within CRA assessment areas, the central finding of the study-
that the CRA examination process led banks to engage in riskier
lending-is called into question.
A simple metaphor can help illuminate this methodological
flaw. Consider if federal highway speed limits only applied to
certain highways. Let's call them "federally regulated
highways." If the federal government lowered the speed limit on
such highways to sixty miles per hour but states were free to
permit higher speed limits on non-federally regulated highways,
and if a study of traffic deaths after the imposition of these lower
speed limits showed increased traffic deaths, one would need to
know where such traffic deaths occurred-that is, did they occur
on federally regulated highways or not? If one did not
differentiate between traffic deaths on federally regulated
highways and those that occurred outside of those highways,
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where the speed limit had not been reduced, one could not say
that the lowered speed limit caused more vehicular deaths.
Indeed, one could easily argue that the lowered speed limit in
federally regulated highways caused reckless drivers to move to
non-federally regulated highways and to drive at higher speeds
there, resulting in more automobile-related carnage. The NBER
study seems to suffer from a similar flaw. By not identifying the
extent to which the elevated lending they appear to have
identified actually occurred in banks' assessment areas, it is
impossible to say whether the CRA caused such lending, or, as is
also possible, such lending increased only outside of CRA-covered
areas. If the research suggests that the elevated lending was, in
fact, riskier, and if such elevated lending took place in areas not
covered by the CRA, then an argument could easily be made-as
with the federal highway standard example-that CRA coverage
in those assessment areas led banks to make riskier loans
beyond the CRA's coverage.
e. No Connection Between Default Rate and Loan Originations
Similarly, another weakness in the research is that it does
not indicate any connection between an elevated number of loans
originated and the elevated default rate. In order to establish a
connection between the CRA examination and the elevated
default rate-a conclusion the researchers appear to reach12 -
there would have to be some connection between the loans that
were made in light of the CRA examination and the elevated
default rates. If the researchers believe that certain loans would
not have been made in the absence of a pending CRA
examination, in order to conclude that the CRA led to riskier
lending, there would have to be some connection between the
loans that would not have been made in the absence of the CRA
and the elevated default rate. In other words, one cannot blame
the CRA for risky lending if it is not clear that the loans made to
satisfy regulators were more risky than other loans not included
in the CRA examination.
To return to the highway regulation metaphor: If there were
increases in accidents on federally regulated highways, one
would need to know whether drivers involved in such accidents
were abiding by the speed limit to determine whether the
120 See Agarwal et al., supra note 9, at 3.
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lowered speed limit had any effect on traffic safety. To say that a
small percentage of loans originated around the time of banks'
respective CRA examinations defaulted at a higher rate than the
loans made by banks not undergoing CRA examinations, one
would need to show that this elevated lending led to greater loan
delinquency. The NBER study does not attempt to show this.
f Connection Between CRA Effect and the Financial Crisis
Putting aside the strength of the findings of the NBER study
and their relevance to CRA enforcement, one further question
remains. In order to connect the supposed CRA effect to the
causes of the financial crisis, one would need to connect the
lending identified in this study as purportedly caused by the CRA
to the overall lending during the lead up to the financial crisis.
Even if one were to assume that all of the lending identified in
this study did in fact fall within the rubric of the CRA, the
question would then remain: To what extent are the results the
researchers found really significant in terms of the "big picture"?
The researchers tended to find that the largest effect, if any,
the CRA examination process had on lending was during the
2004-2006 period, and there among only the largest banks-that
is, the forty-nine banks with assets above $50 billion.'21 This is
less than ten percent of the banks in the country, although they
are responsible for forty-nine percent of the nation's lending.122
Other research shows that no more than six percent of the
riskiest subprime lending carried out in the height of the
subprime mortgage frenzy was even covered by the CRA.12 ' The
researchers suggest their findings should lead one to conclude
the following: (1) the largest banks appear to have increased
their riskiest lending in response to the CRA examination
process; (2) such increase in lending represented an actual
increase in loan volume; (3) the banks did so in their CRA
assessment areas; and (4) such lending led to an increase in
delinquencies. Even if these findings were all true and apparent
from the research, it is not clear that the lending identified
represents a significant percentage of the lending that took place
during the subprime market's heyday. That is, if all of the new
lending identified was higher risk loans, and within each
121 See id. at 21-22.
122 Reid et al., supra note 111, at 8.
123 Canner & Bhutta, supra note 5, at 3.
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reviewed bank's CRA portfolio, then it is possible that what those
researchers have identified is a roughly five percent increase in
lending within a group of loans that were only six percent of
subprime loans. Thus, accepting this study's findings as
reflecting actual CRA lending, it is possible that, at most, they
have found that 0.3% of all subprime lending was a result of the
CRA. In other words, without making an explicit connection
between (1) the identified increase in the loan acceptance rate
and the CRA, (2) the loan and the lending bank's respective CRA
assessment area, (3) the delinquency of such loans, and (4) the
volume of lending actually covered by the CRA in relation to the
overall volume of lending during the buildup of the mortgage
market, it is impossible to determine the role the CRA actually
played, if any, in increasing risky lending. The weight of the
evidence seems to suggest, still, that its role was marginal, if it
had any role at all.
Moreover, comparing the delinquency rate found by the
researchers-that loans to CRA-eligible communities seem to
have a ninety-day delinquency rate of, at most, two percent124 -to
the national serious delinquency rate-that is, mortgages more
than ninety days past due-of nearly ten percent, 125 the loans the
NBER researchers appear to have reviewed, and even those
purportedly made in the shadow of the CRA, seem to have
performed better than loans generally, and far better than
subprime loans, which had their own serious delinquency rate of
nearly thirty percent. 26  Given that the loans the NBER
researchers identified as being originated as a result of the CRA
seem to have performed better than the average loan in the
2000s, and much better than subprime loans generally, it is hard
to argue that it is these loans-even assuming all of the loans the
study identified were covered by the CRA-were riskier than the
typical loan extended in the 2000s. Indeed, it is easy to see that
124 See Agarwal et al., supra note 9, at 34 tbl.5.
125 See Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies and Foreclosure
Starts Decrease in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Aug. 26, 2010),
available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/newsandmedia/presscenter/73799.htm
(noting national serious delinquency rate of 9.11%).
126 See Shane M. Sherlund, The Past, Present, and Future of Subprime
Mortgages 2 (Div. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2008-63, 2008), available at
http'//www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200863/200863pap.pdf (noting serious
delinquency rate of subprime loans of roughly thirty percent).
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such loans appear to have been above average in quality, if one
simply compares the delinquency rates of the different classes of
loans.
C. The State of the Research
Thus, while the weight of the evidence appears to indicate
CRA-related lending was far less risky than subprime lending,
and that the overwhelming majority of subprime lending took
place beyond the scope of the CRA, the evidence against these
findings has its methodological flaws. Even if one were to accept
the NBER researchers' findings, they seem to indicate a minimal
impact on the overall rate of subprime lending during the height
of the subprime mortgage frenzy. Still, even accepting those
findings, the researchers identified loans that performed much
better than the typical loan extended during the mid-2000s.
Although the evidence seems to exonerate the CRA on whether it
caused the financial crisis, the evidence also seems to indicate
that some of the charges against the CRA hold up-that is, that
the CRA failed to prevent the crisis from having an adverse
impact on the communities it was designed to protect. The lack
of enforcement of the CRA and the absence of a private right of
action for non-regulators to enforce it likely meant that the CRA
had little impact of bank practices during the mid-2000s,
especially financial institutions not covered by the CRA. As I
wrote elsewhere, the CRA was a financial Maginot line: easily
circumvented, lightly defended, and quickly overrun. 127
IV. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR REFORM
There are a number of areas in which the CRA could be
reformed to bring it into the twenty-first century and fulfill its
mission of encouraging banks to meet the needs of low- and
moderate-income communities. For one, the many gaps in
coverage of the CRA need to be filled. Second, giving private and
public entities the ability to enforce the statute in the courts
127 Brescia, supra note 27, at 627. As others have pointed out, one of the main
drivers of the housing bubble that ultimately led to the financial crisis was not
government policies, like the CRA, but, rather, the growth of the private-label
securities market, which, itself, was a product not of over-regulation, but under-
regulation. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing
Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1228-52 (2012).
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would likely give the examination and transaction approval
processes more import. If regulators and financial institutions
knew the outcome of those processes could be challenged in the
courts, such processes might be different in some instances.
Third, regulators can, today, use the CRA to strengthen financial
institution practices with respect to mortgage modifications.
While current regulator guidance states that bank practices in
the area of loan modifications can be take into account in the
CRA examination process, 128 regulators can begin to give greater
prominence to bank performance in this area in that process.
Such an emphasis might improve this performance, which is
currently fairly woeful. While the first two areas for reform may
be difficult to accomplish without legislative action, and few
believe reform of the CRA to make it stronger could pass a
divided Congress, the third area of reform-taking modifications
seriously-could be done through administrative channels, and
might be just the stick that is needed to improve bank
performance in this area.
A. Expand the Scope: What it Covers, Who it Covers
In March of 2009, Democratic Congresswoman Eddie
Johnson of Texas introduced the Community Reinvestment
Modernization Act of 2009 ("CRMA"). 129 The CRMA attempted a
significant overhaul of the CRA, including proposing the
following changes: extending CRA obligations to affiliates of
covered institutions; enhancing the bank rating process by
including more potential grades and requiring a separate CRA
grade for each bank's individual assessment area; expanding the
definition of assessment area; requiring banks that receive low
grades in any assessment area to generate an improvement plan;
ensuring that communities of color are explicitly covered under
the act; and expanding coverage to securities companies,
insurance companies, mortgage banks, and certain credit
unions. 130
See Interagency Questions and Answers, supra note 7, at 11,645.
' H.R. 1479, 111th Cong. (2009).
130 For an overview of the CRMA, see Raymond H. Brescia, A CRA for the 211'
Century: Congress Considers the Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of
2009, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POLy REP., Oct. 2009, at 1-15.
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While some of the revisions are likely designed to combat the
problems in the mortgage market from the 2000s, there is no
doubt that the CRA's emphasis on redlining and capital
exportation are really concerns from the 1970s. Efforts to
modernize the CRA from its conceptualization of banks as bricks-
and-mortar institutions that physically take deposits from here
and lend there are as quaint in the twenty-first century as the
Bailey Building & Loan of "It's a Wonderful Life." Today,
financial institutions are global and digital, extending their
services into communities where they have no physical presence
because of their virtual reach. A CRA that more accurately
reflects how financial institutions operate today is necessary, and
some of the CRMA's provisions, like those that expand the
definition of CRA assessment areas, are critical. But the chances
of passage of the CRMA have dimmed.
The CRMA never came up for a full vote in Congress.' And
its prospects in the Republican-controlled House of
Representatives are non-existent. It is possible that a watered-
down version of the legislation, one that makes the CRA
examination process easier on financial institutions that score
well on their CRA examinations and includes some of the
CRMA's modernizing provisions, might enjoy bi-partisan support,
but such a bill has yet to be introduced by representatives in
either party. Reform today is likely to come from the bank
regulators, who can take some action without congressional
approval, an issue taken up again in Part IV.C.
B. Private Right of Action
The absence of a meaningful way for private individuals to
enforce the CRA's protections is particularly salient in the wake
of the financial crisis, when private and public litigants have
used litigation and the threat of civil and criminal penalties to
force banks to take remedial action for some of the worst lending
practices during the buildup of the subprime mortgage market.
In the lead up to and fallout from the recent financial crisis, risky
bank practices clearly had adverse impacts on low- and
moderate-income communities, particularly communities of
131 See H.R. 1479 (1111h): Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2009,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/11 1/hr1479#overview (last
visited Aug. 23, 2014).
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color, 112 in apparent violation of the spirit of the CRA. If law
enforcement officials and private litigants had had the ability to
enforce the CRA through the courts, perhaps that would have
provided an additional tool to protect low- and moderate-income
communities from harmful bank practices. With the federal
agencies tasked with enforcing the CRA susceptible to agency
capture, a phenomenon that some suggest occurred in the mid-
2000s just as the subprime mortgage market was overheating, 133
having more entities in the enforcement mix may have meant
that harmful bank practices would have been exposed through
channels other than the bank examination process, itself
completely in the hands of those very agencies susceptible to
capture.
Of course, enforcement of the statute in its current form
would likely do little to improve bank practices in low- and
moderate-income communities, and would have had little impact
on improving the practices that led to the foreclosure crisis. Most
importantly, if the CRA covered very little of the lending that led
to the crisis, it is hard to argue that a CRA enforceable through
the courts would have had much of an impact on financial
institution practices not covered by the Act. What's more, the
terms of the CRA leave little by way of standards for courts to
enforce. As with the enforcement campaign in the wake of the
so-called Robo-Sign Scandal, however, certain practices, even if
they do not appear to directly violate the letter of a particular
statute, were brought under enforcement efforts to pursue
common law and general statutory provisions which outlawed
"unfair and deceptive practices. 13 6 Similarly, it is fairly easy to
see that practices like predatory subprime loans, with onerous
terms that were marketed to and for low- and moderate-income
communities, and unquestionably had a harmful effect on such
communities, were not consistent with meeting the needs of such
communities, nor were they consistent with safe and sound
132 See supra Part II.A.
133 See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the
Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3
HARv. L. & POLNY REV. 369, 384-89 (2009) (describing the "revolving door" concept in
financial regulatory agencies during the mid-2000s).
134 For a description of the legal claims underlying the Robo-Sign investigation,
see Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of the
Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 ME. L. REV. 17, 27, 34-38 (2011).
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banking practices. Indeed, given the ultimate impact of such
practices on the health of many financial institutions, it is fairly
easy to see that they were the opposite of safe and sound.
Like with the CRMA, however, congressional action is likely
necessary to create a private right of action under the CRA.
While the prospects for such action might be slim, one avenue for
this reform would be to encourage state legislatures to pass
amendments to their own state CRA corollaries. 35 If states that
have their own CRA statute were able to explore this avenue and
amend those statutes to provide for a private right of action, it
could give private and public entities, like state attorneys
general, an opportunity to inject themselves into state-based
community reinvestment reviews where they occur. It would
also allow these prospective litigants to explore their role in the
compliance process and provide a testing ground for these types
of actions, perhaps opening the door for federal action on this
front.
C. Improve Loan Modification Performance
Finally, one potential area for reform that does not
necessarily require congressional intervention would be for the
administrative agencies charged with enforcing the CRA to take
seriously bank performance in modifying underwater loans.
While the extant inter-agency guidance on the CRA recognizes
that the regulators can take into account covered banks' practices
regarding loan modifications, 3 6 the poor record of banks
modifying loans indicates that regulators are not necessarily
using this authority to apply pressure on banks to improve
performance in this area. While efforts in Congress to give
consumers the ability to modify their mortgages in bankruptcy
court have failed,1 37 regulators can use the CRA examination
process and the application review mechanism to apply more
pressure on financial institutions to modify more loans. This can
be accomplished through administrative action, and does not
require congressional approval. For now, one of the most
pressing financial issues facing low- and moderate-income
communities is the weight of underwater mortgages. Vigilant
135 See, e.g., Banks and Banking-Rules and Regulations-Technical
Corrections, 2013 Sess. Law News of N.Y., ch. 227, A. 7213-A, § 28-b (McKinney).
136 See Interagency Questions and Answers, supra note 7, at 11,645.
137 See 155 CONG. REc. 31,367-70, 31,414-15 (2009).
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enforcement of the spirit of the CRA by regulators in the area of
mortgage modification can help fulfill the CRA's goal of
encouraging financial institutions to meet the credit needs of the
communities the law was designed to protect.
CONCLUSION
As the previous discussion shows, the CRA played no
appreciable role in causing the present financial crisis. The true
indictment of the statute, however, is that it failed to insulate
low- and moderate-income communities from the harshest
impacts of the crisis. While modernization of the CRA is
necessary so that it can more closely reflect the realities of the
financial system of the twenty-first century, any significant
overhaul will require congressional action, and it is unlikely that
Congress, in its current makeup, will support an effort to
strengthen the Act, either by expanding its scope or providing for
a private right of action to enforce its terms. At the same time,
the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the CRA can
take steps today to ameliorate some of the harshest consequences
of the crisis and use the CRA examination and application
process to apply more pressure on banks to modify more
mortgages on terms that are just.
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